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Shortage after surplus. 
INTR0TlUCTION 
~,J~~a_-.;J.s.._  . ......_ 
The  coQOon  organization of the oarket in cereals,  which served as  a  model 
for the orgru1ization of the other agricultural markets, 
celebn:~d its twelfth birthday in August  1974•  Granted, this was 
not  a  vr::r·y  special occasion;  nevertheless, starting frcn the fact that 
it does  r'-'t  0ount  as  one  of the problem children of the colilt'lon  agricultural 
policy~ :i_:;s  development up to now  should be outlined here,  in view of the 
manifc]_.~  .,.  (Jften rapidly changing events which were  decisive for this sector. 
In i:!:.-;1  s:::::ond  part the market  organization instruments used for: each 
situation are discussed in detail. 
The  first part of this account  can be ver,y brief.  Regulation No  19 on the 
progressive establishment of the  coonon organization of the market  in cereals 
superseded the national oarket organizations in the Cornnunity_of  Six by 
introducing Connunity arrangements  for foreign trade  and domestic markets. 
All national protective r:.1easures,  and in particular the quanti teti  ve res-
.trictions on iop.orts,  were  abolished.  Since there were still disparities 
in prices between the l•1onber  States,  intra...Corn:nmi ty levies had to be 
applied,  and  even the uniform levy  vis-~-vis non-member countries was 
a.  thing of the future.  It vJaS  not  possible gradually to approximate the 
target prices  of the individual  l\.~er;1ber States,  as had originally been ple.nned, 
so it was  decided to go  straight over to  a  co~on cereals price with effect 
fron  1 July 1967.  Admittedly,  very difficult negotiations t-tere  required 
to  reach this decision,  which  was  taken on 15  Decenber 1964.  The  Council 
of ~.tinisters finn.lly agreed to an average price level as  proposed by the 
Commission.  It based its decision on the fact that  such  a  price level 
would  reduce  farm proceeds in those Menber States whose  prices had hitherto 
been highe~ - for this reason,  equalization payments to Germany,  Italy and 
Luxembourg ,,:ere  nec€ssar,y - but  would increase faro incomes in those Member 
States ;mere :prices had hitherto been lower.  The  creation of an average - 2- X/658/74-E 
price level was  designed to avoid an  expansion of production nnd  the 
resulting foroation of surpluses which,  according to the line of thought 
followed at the time in the light of the world market  situation,  could 
be cleared, if at all, only at great  expense  and  furthemore would have 
repercussions  on  oomnorcial policy if in due  course the world market  price 
were  to be considerably lovser  than the Conrrru.ni ty price.  It vtas  considered 
important that the agricultural  (price) policy of the Community  should 
leave import possibilities open for non-nember countries.  The  Council  of 
Ministers took  a  far-reaching decision  ~mich did not  evoke  any noteworthy 
public reaction at the time but  which after some  years was  to give rise to 
heated discussion, i.e. the fixing of the cereals prices in units of 
account  (u.c.).  This  was  intended to  ensure that price decisions,  once 
taken,  h~uld remain unaffected by any currency fluctuations in the 
individual 1:enber States. 
II.  1967/6C:  no  ~!;icular ~rprises 
1.  ~Ea~s~oE ~f_i~t!a:C£~i1y_t!a~~ 
In the  1967/68  m~rketing year,  intra-Cotumxnity trade increased by some 
14%  as  coiJpr:.red  with the previous year.  The  effect of tho disappearance 
of intra-connuni  ty frontiers was  oost noticeable in the trade in wheat, 
Nhich  showed  en  increase of  113~b.  This  figure must  be  seen,  however,  in 
the light of the fact that in the 1966/67  marketing year imports of wheat 
fran Member  States had fallen by  33%,  caused to a  large extent by a  drop 
in the French harvest of 3.5 million metric tons.  The  main  consumers  of EEC 
wheat  in 1967/68  were  Gerwany  and  the Netherlands,  which together accounted 
for 74%  of total inports.  Gemany imported 581  460 metric tons,  which  was 
nore than h:rice  the amount  inported in the previous year,  and the 
Netherlands  i~ported 291  031  netric tons,  which  was  more  than five tines 
as cruch  as in the  previous year.  Germany  was  also the main  importer of 
barley,  with 809  943  metric tons,  giving an increase of 11%  over 1966/67. 
The  percentage increase in Bclgiun/Luxenbourg was  even higher  (39%),  with 
total imports of 445  121  metric tons.  On  the other hand, .maize  iraports 
dropped in all the Member  States with the exception of the Benelux countries. 
The  biggest  drop of all was  in Germany, by 83%  (835  590  nettie tons).  This 
concerned oainly the maize  fran the 11rea  south of the Loire,  which  t-vas  not 
cheap for German  consuoers. - 3- X/658/74-E 
2.  Increased intervention  ------ ..... -----
In 1967/681  intervention (State buying to maintcin intervention price 
levels) increased for all cereals except  durum  wheat.  Tne  main  reason 
for this-was the  exceptionally good harvest in 1967,  especially of wheat 
in Germany.  The  changes  in the system of regional prices in south 
Germany,  together with the  lack of export  possibilities,  probably 
contributed to the rise in quantities of intervention wheat  in that area  •. 
Since intervention measures  could no  longer be taken at national level, 
intervention agencies started to buy in supplies  (intervention A)  in 
France in 1967/68,  and  the extent of special intervention measures 
(intervention B)  declined.  Furthernore,  in France the late decision 
to grant  no  carry-over payment  for barley and  the difficulties arising 
at the end of the marketing year affected the interventions A and  B for 
this type of cereal.  A comparison of production with domestic  consumption 
revealod: thnt 1  for 1967/68,  taking ii!lports  into account,  there was  a 
surplus of'  more  than 6 nillion metric tons of wheat,  of  \~hich 4  .• 8 million 
metric tons including flour was  exported.  IJost  of the rest had to be taken 
over by the intervention agencies.  In the case of barley there was  an 
overall surplus of approximately 3 million metric tons,  of-which some 
1.4 million metric tons were  exported.  Despite a  considerable increase 
in donestio  consumption,  the transitional stocks,  particularly tho 
intervention stocks,  increased in comparison with the previous year. 
3.  Bi~her exports,  lo~r imoorts  _____________ ..... __ _ 
Total exports of cereals  (not  counting the processed products)  in 1967/68 
increased by  24%  in conparison ~th the previous year.  This  increase was 
due  mainly to  the  considerable rise in wheat  exports  (44%)  and barley 
exports  (55%).  France contributed most  to this development; it accounted 
for 89%  of the  exports,  thereby maintaining its position as  the leading 
exporting country in the Community.  Declines in exports from  Germany  ancl 
the Benelux C?untries were  caused by the  discontinu~ce of_concessions in 
the case of re-exportation of'  imported cereals  which  had been allowed 
before the common  crgani zo.tion of the market  came  into effect.  The X/658/74-E 
increc,se in exports  fr:>m  the Netl1erlands  was  due  to  its being geographicn.lly 
f<LV0urc.bl~r situated. for m:porting Corumni ty cereals.  Furthernore,  the 
Comnunity  once  ag~in exported large qun.ntities of Wheat  in the  form  of' 
flour. 
Despite the bigger harvest  and the increase in intra-ComTIUnity trade, 
imports  were  alnost at the snne  level  Le.S  the previous year, if naize 
and  sorghun are  no~ taken into account.  ·In 1967/68,  as in the previous 
narketing years  t  Italy was  the leading cereals-inporting country in the 
Conmunity,  followed by  GerBany,  which  continued to  inport the nost wheat. 
III.  Surplus  fornation pnd  co~mter neasures 
The  1968/69  marketing year was  characterized-by an especially o~fficult 
narket  situation.  The  excellent harvest  of 1968  yielded n  supply_ for 
which  there was  no  corresponding denand,  particularly on  the domestic 
narket.  Moreover, ·nonetary problcns continued to  worsen in the last feN 
mo~1ths of the ma.rkding year.  , The  high forward discounts for the 
French franc resulted in French cereals being available on  the market 
in quanti  ties which  no  longer corresponded to the actual narket  require-
nents;  this was  particularly so  in th~ northern countries of the. 
Comtrunity.  Since these cereals were.on offer at prices below the inter-
vention price,  donestic production had to be taken over by the intervention 
agencies.  It becaoe more  and more  the practice to obtain cereals for the 
sole purpose .of selling them under  ~dvantngeous conditi9ns to the German, 
Dutch  nnd  Belgian intervention agencies.  This  developoe!1.t  caused the 
Connission in May 1969  to limit intervention in Gernany,  Belgium  and the 
Netherlands  on cereals harvested in these Member  States.  In this way .i  i; 
was  possible to  prevent  speculative moveoent  of commodities. 
2.  InterVention stocks at  record·levels 
The  considerable increase in intervention in the 1968/69 marketing year 
was  also influenced by the fact  th~t the derived intervention prices in 
some  Gernan production regions hindered tho  outflow of cereals to the 
consunier regions in the Rhine  and 'the Ruhr.  This  opened up additional J- '(  !r >  ;~ 
sales possibilities for goods  from  those  regions in the north of France 
which  were  favourably situated as  regards transport.  In 1968/69  a 
total of approximately 5  t~illion netric tons of cereals had to be taken 
over by the intervention ngencies;  that was  18o%  or 3.15 nillion metric 
tons more  than in the previous marketing year.  There was  no  corresponding 
outflovr  of intervention cereals,  Po  ·thd on  31  July 1969  the  stockP 
in hand  at the intervention agencies had  reached a  record level of 6.1 
million metric tons.  The  situation for common  wheat  l'ICS  particularly 
critical:  it accounted for 4.4  of those  6.1  million oetric tons. 
3.  !OCEe~s!v~ P.h~s!n~~o~_o! ~EPlu~e~ 
The  beginning of the 1969/70 marketing year must  be  seen in the light of 
the unfavourable developnent  of the  p~evious year. ·Transitional stocks 
which  were  far in excess of the nomal stocks exerted pressure on  the 
market  and  caused serious storage probleos in Germany  and in certain 
parts of Italy.  This situation was  made  even nore difficult in Germany 
because of the persistent  rumours  regarding the impending revaluetion of 
the D-Mark.  Since holders of stocks of cereals considered intervention 
as the only possible way  of avoiding financial lossest it seeoed  likely 
that there would  be  nn  increase in intervention stocks resulting in a 
serious  shqrtage of storage space available to the Geman intervention 
agencies.  .And,  since constant  intervention is a  principle of the conmon 
organizatio~ of the oarket in cereals,  effective but  expensive measures 
had to be  taken in order to prevent  serious difficulties from  arising. 
These  included promoting the denaturing of cornnon  wheat  by raising the 
denaturirtg premium,  thereby rechannelling it into the fodder sector; 
different storage arrangements f?r intervention cereals;  special 
intervention measures for Germnny  which  made  it possible to sell the 
quantities  deliv~red from  France under the terms of the old contracts with-
out  creating difftcultiea for domestic  production while  at the same  time 
stimulating the marketing of Germany  cereals froo December  1969; 
encouragement  of exports to third countries.  F1nally,the devaluation of the 
French  fr-anc  removed  the uncertainty that hnd hitherto existed.  The 
consequent  increase in Frenoh market  organization prices  ~-s not  completed, 
however,  until the beginning of the 1971/72 marketing year; in the meantime, 
coopaneatory payments in respect of foreign trade were  either paid or imposed.  Correspondingly  t  in line with the revaluation of the D-IIlark  in 
1969,  the :::mrket  organization price::;  expressed in D-!lfarks  were  lm'lered on 
1 Janual"J 1970,  this TJeasure being accompanied by the granting of compen-
sator,Y  paynents to German  agriculture.  At  the  end of the 1969/70 marketing 
year,  inter\·ention stocks were  considerably lower:  775  000  netric tons of 
coiDDon  '"heat  and  209  000  r.1etric  tons of barley.  Rye  still presented prob-
ler1S,  however;  the German  intervention agencies'  stocks rose to 810  000 
EJ.etric  tons by  31  July 1970. 
4.  No  definitive solution 
The  1970/71  marketing yer:,r  began with no mal cereals  stocks after the ·stocks 
of the previous year had been substantially reduced as  a  result of export 
and denaturing of comr,:on  wheat.  The  GI!laller harvest  and the  lot-rer cariJr-over 
stocks  decreased the cereals stocks for the 1970/71  marketing year by 
approximately 6-7 million net  ric tons  compared td  th the  stocks  of 1969/70. 
This had a  stabilizing effect  on market  developnent.  At  the  same  tine,  ~nth 
sales nore buoyant  and operators carrying rather higher stocks,  the  inte~ 
vention quanti  ties bought  in contrc.cted sharply. 
The  consttoption of cereals in the  Co~ununity rose to  some  77.8 nillion metric 
tons in 1970/71.  The  reason for this  ~;as the increase in the  consumption of 
cereals as  fodder,  caused by the increase in production of pigs for slaughter 
as 1rell us  of eggs  m'lcl  poul  trymeat.  The  market  continued· to  sho\'1  a  preference 
for maize as  a  fodder cereal,  as is evidenced by  a  consumption of 16.5 
million TJetric  tons.  Approximately 8  million r.1etric  tons of Wheat  was used 
for feed,  about  half of 1·.hich  was  in denatured forn.  But  only  from  time to 
time  tmre  we  able to forget  the curplus problem.  The  cereals harvest of 
1971  brought it to mind a.gain.  'lhere  t-ras  a  record harvest  of  some  77  ni  llion 
net  ric tons, uhich exceeded the previous  record harvest of 1969  by around 
950.  'Ihe  greatest  quantitative increase was  in the production of cor:nnon 
Hhent.  In the 1971/72  r.w.rketing year, barley benefited from  a  considerable 
der.mnd  from certain non-J.i1ember  countries,  and this had an tinexpected stabi-
lizing effect on the barley market.  Besides maize the surplus  comnon  wheat 
nlso benefited from this development,  so  that  denaturing reached more  or 
less the  same  level as in the previous year.  The  high harvest  a.gain 
resulted in la.rge  intervention purchases.  In thecase of barley,  there was 
an exceptior..ally great  quan-tity of t-linter barley,  for  1~hich the required 
oinimtL~ quality ctill constituted an  excessively high intervention induce-
ment.  Furthernore1  in the  ca.se  of this cereal,  too,  the intervention possi-
bility from  -the  first  r~onth of the marketing year resulted in a  lack of 
active  effort to keep stocks  and  mru<e  cor.:mercial  sales. - 7 -
Almost  100%  of the  intervention winter barley had to be taken over in 
the first hw months  of the  marketing year. 
degree of intervention for rye  continued.  The  main  reasons for the 
persisti:1g difficulties in the  case  of rye were the 'tmfnvourable  price_ 
. 
ratio to fodder grain,  which still exists,  and  the  fixu1g of different 
intervention prices in different reeions,  a  practice which is in conflict 
with the  market  rules  anci  he.s  Fince  ceased. 
IV.  Reversal  to  shortace 
The  1972/73  marketing year  saw  the beginning of a  development  of Hhic:1 
very little account  had been  trucen  when  the details of tho  organization 
of the mrket  in cereals  vJere  l·rorked  ont.  It started t·li th the purchase 
by the  USSR  of vast  qun.nt i ties of rtheat  and  fodcler  cereals.  V.Tithin 
about  six months  this country boucht  nearly 30  roj llion metric tom;  fror1  the 
USA  and  Car1cda,  Austrcli~,  Sweden,  the  Community  and  even Rumania. 
Purchases  from the  USA,  amounted  to  18  million Metric tone,  t~hich corrcspo:;.1ds 
to 40%  of cereal exports fro;;, that  country in .n.  normal  3rear.  This  import 
demand  fror.1  the  Soviet  Union vms  accompc.mied  by an equall;;: high demand 
from other import  countries  1  e,  bad harvest  in Australin.,  and the lack 
of ancho\'Y  shoals  in Peruvia."l wo..ters.  The  attempt  to  mwce  up for the 
shortfall of  Peruvian fishrneal  production by  soyabean protein increcsed 
the price of  soya beans  and with it the  price of t'rheat  and fodder.  The 
effects of this were  pn.rticularly noticeable  in tho:':e  iieli1ber  States whic!1 
depend to  a  large  extent  on  imports  n.nd  to Hhich the ,;tccession  compensetor;;r 
amount  in accordance with the rules  of the Accel:'sion Treaty cnn11ot  be 
applied t;here  the world market  price _exceeds  that of the  Conmunity.  This 
resulted in market  prices which  tvere  considerably higher then the 
intervention price,  especially in the  United Kingdom  and  Ireland. 
Although in 1972  the wheat  harvest  of 41.1  million r;1etric  tons  in ·the 
nine  cOlmtries which now  constitute the  Community  exceeded the  40.1 
million metric tone of the previous yec.r1  and  altho1..1gh  1973  showed  no· 
chance  us  compared with  1972,  the beginning of the  1973/74  marketing 
year brought  regional supply difficulties for Italy.  l1s  a  result unprecedented quantities of French '1'1heo.t  t-.'ere  SE::l1t  to Italy1  uherc the 
wheat  harvest  had fallen below normal.  Froncl:.  wlceat  deliveries in 
August  1973  were  167  700  metric tons as against  only  21  000  metric  tons 
in the  corresponding r.1onth  of the  previoue year.  Furthermore  200  000 
netric tons of whoo.t  from the  stocks of German,  French and Belgian 
intervention agencies  wer0  ronde  availa"'.:lle  for the purpose  of  supplying 
the Italian population toith foodstuffs.  The  Italian intervention 
agencies  solU.  107  000  metric tons of  common  wheat  from their o'tm  stocks 
in order to cover the  most  urgent  needs of southern Italy.  Finally, 
a  ban was  placed on exports of durum wlwat  from the  Comr.n.mity  - which 
incidentally is otill in force  - and also  on exports of flour,  ~Toats 
and  meal  IIL.."..de  fro!ll  Italian wheat.  Durbg thir-;  period tlle  insufficier.t 
graduation of intervention prices within the  Community  ll1..'Ulife::;ted  itself 
disadvantaceously in tho.t  it was  not  possible to channel  tho  cereals 
automatically to the areas where  they  ~~ere needed. 
3.  £o:!!m~!  til:  !;e~eEt~e!c.:::_s  _  c_£n.:::_c2;o~s-o! ::e,:::p::n.::_iE_ili!_y  _  t5:'~'1.§;r9:s  _  n~,n=m~m'!?_c;: 
countries 
The  Cowmunity  i·; also  aware  of its respcndbility towards its tre.ditional 
customer  cou.."ltries  and particularly of  it~ obligations to the developing 
countries.  Col!lll'Ullity  food  aid in the  form of cere1:1.ls  now  co~;1es  to  a<"l 
annual total of  1.287  million metric tons,  whereas  the  CoDll!lunity  of Six 
used to  provide  1 ,G35  million metric tons.  i,ID.intenance  of the first 
figure at that level requires a  25~; inc:r:ease  in expenditure.  In order 
to  make  a  larc.;er quantity of common  \'<hee.t  available for  ezport  and 
thereby  EuppJ.ement  the  Rupply on the world.  mnrket,  the  Cou;misE:ion  decided 
to drastically reduce  the  inducement  to  convert  ccromon  w:1e<:•.:i;  into fodder 
by  gTantin.:: deUG.tu.ring  premiums  wit~1 effect  from  1 November  1973?  since 
10  February  197~  no  premiums of this kind have been granted.  Theoretically 
Epeakinc,  however,  a  premium  c<m  still be  granted if the necewary conditions 
are present,  which  in the  E'.hort  terr.1 is unlikely to be the case.  The 
fact  of the  mc.tter  iD  that,  except  for  a  brief period,  t~le Horld m'U'ket 
price has been clecrly above  the  Comrrnmity  price ever since the  autc;mn 
of  1973,  a  situf'..t ion in direct contrast  with that preve.ilin.:;  Nhen  the 
common  orgrnizn.tion of the  1:1arl:et  in cerealr>  ce.me  into effect,  In line 
with this development,  the  attit'lde of the  US.'l  has  c:..ls?  chr.mt;,ed,  The 
c-,ccusation that the  Comr.nmity  'tras  pursuing  8.11  aggressive  exp::~rt  policy 
which interfered with sales by tradition.::,l  cereals-exportine countries, 
vJith  the object  of  providinl~ artificial protection for tmcompetitive 
Community ag"I·iculture,  has receded  into the backgrotmd.  At  the  time tho  Cvnummity  was  o.ble  to defend.  itself by pointing to the  increase in 
US  exports,  er>pecially  roya,  to Europe  and also by pointing out  that  a 
comparison of support  payments  in USA  aericulture with those  in Community 
agricult~cre showed  an adv.antage for the USA.  At  present the  ComruunHy  is 
urgently needed as  a  source of supply on the world !lk"'..'ket  in order .to 
enable  a  policy of equalizction  in internn.tional  co:1te:rt  t.o  be  applied. 
(a)  ~  in e,fil?Of~ 
Investi[;'ation of the  Community  export  trade  in cereals shows  a  clear upward 
trend.  Admittedly, at the time this report  l'>ras  written o.  complete  survey 
was  available only for  the  1972/73  marketing year,  in which yeo.r the 
shortage  on the world market  hacl  not yet  manifested itself so cleariy. 
In the  case of wheat  exports from the  Community  we  are rrainly concerned 
with  common  wheat,  whereas  the  imports consist to  a  large extent of durum 
wheat  for the  rnanufacture  of eroats,  rneal  and paste products as  well  as 
quality wheat,  i.e. types "rith a  high baking value for mixing \'lith  Community 
wheat.  It mm;t  be  stated however tlmt  in recent  yeo.rs. the  cultivo.tion of 
wheo.t  with high baking qualities has been ereo.tly increo.sed in the  Commu:1ity1 
particularly in France.  This >s  reflected in the decline in Community 
imports,  which is dealt '1-dth  in gTeater detail below.  Besides  common 
whea.t,  barley plays an  importc.nt  part  in exportc.  According to the 
Statistical Office of the  Ev~opero1 Co~munities, the wheat  exports including 
by-products of the original Community  of Six 'l'rere  14.17 million metric tons 
in 1972/73 as  compared with  10.28  raillion metric tons  in 1971/72 1  the grec.ter 
part of which  (8.81  million n:ctric tons and  6.30 million metric  tons, 
respectively)  came  from France.  This,  therefore,  constituted an increase 
of  37 .8%.  A cor.1parison bet\veen the  average for "1971/72"  determined  over 
a  number· of years and the  n.verage  for "1967/68"  shows  a  yearly incrense  ,-,f 
6.1fo  in the rate of growth.  If the  United Kincdor!1  Denmo.rk  and Ireland 
are  COl.mted  as  I>!ember  States for this period - the  Community  ~kct 
·organization c2.me  into effect  in.  these  countries on  1  February 1973  -
exports decline  to  12.C4  million metric tons·.  In addition to this,  the 
United Kingdom  exported  167  000  metric tons.  In the year under review 
the Comn1unity  of Six exported 7.60 million metric tons of tvheat  and 4.34 
million metric tons of barley,  as  oppo:c:ed  to 4.82. million metric tons  of 
wheat  and 4.27 million metric tons of barley in 1971/72;  this constitutes 
an  increa.~Ce of 57 .9~~ for 'i'rheat  and  1.6% for bc.rley.  A  comparir::on  bet'l-reen 
"1971/72"  and "1967/68"  r:;hows  an increase  of  1.5%  for wheat  o.nd  21.  31~ for 
barley on the basis of the  CoL11Iltmity  of Nine.  On  the  srune  basis,  exports 
to  non-member  countries declined by 7.52  million metric tons for 'i'Theat  end 
by 4.08  million metric tonG  for barley.  In ac"dition,  the United Kinc;d.om 
exported  62  OOu  metric tons of  colllllJOn  wheat  and  88  000  metric tom: of  be,rley~ -10-
Fron July 1973  up to and  incl~ding June  1974,  the  Co~ity  of Nine  exported a 
total of 5· 33 million metric tons of wheat  including flour expressed  aE' .cereal 
value,  the deliveries to Britain being  i~  'M.d:i:tio~ to the intra-C~~~ity trade. 
(b)  ~~  irrmacr.t.:1 
Tho  Conr:~unity of Six imported  a  total of 16.73 million metric tons of cereals in 
1972/73  as against  14.35 million metric tons ,in the previous year,  giving an 
increase  of 16.6%;  but  tho percentage  was  -300/o  in 1971/72 .aP  against  1970/71  nnd 
-1.7% in "1971/72"  as agaim:t  "1967 /68".  CO.lculated  in tomr:'  of tho  Col!l!!IU!lity 
of Nine  - cotu1ting imports from  the  United Kingdon  and Denmark  into the  Community 
of Six ac  Con!'lU!lity deliveries - the  import total goes dm·m  to 16.39 million 
netric tons.  In  e~dition to this,  the United  Kingdom  imported 5·9·million 
metric  tons of cereals  in 1972/73,  giving a  total of over  22  million metric tons. 
~&'l..ize, accounted for  tho cajor part  ( +  23%)  of the  imports by the  Cot:!lll1Ul1ity  of Six 
in 1972/73,  tdth 9.86 million metric tons as  opposed to 13.02  million metric tons 
in 1971/72.  A comparison b.ett-recn  1971/72  and  1970/71. shov;s  a  declil}e, ·however, 
of 18.4% and betueen "1971/72"  and  "1967 /68" a  decline  of  3. 31o.  The  high maize 
imports can be attributed to the  increased output  of animal produdts  (pigmeat, 
eggs  and poultry).  Furtheroore,  where  the world r.1arket  price Nas  below  Community 
level,  maize  was  the  oost  favourably priced fodder  cereal,  particularly,at the 
O}..""Pense  of  ba:rl.ey~  Ln  addition to the maize, importP by the .Co:mrmmity  of· <Six  in 
1972/73,  there  Nero  United  Kingdon  icrports to the  amount  of 2.7 million metric 
tons.  Italy wc.s  the  leading  ir:!:porter  of maize  froo non-member  countries,  with 
4.7 million metric  tonE'.  The  total Nhen.t .quantities of 3.5:1  million·metric tons 
conE'tituted an  ioportant  item of the  cereals import  balance for the  Community  of 
.Six  in 1972/73.  There  \-JaS  an  increase  of 10lf  conipc.red  with· 1971/72;  a  decreaf'e, 
however,  of  31~" for  1971/72  compe.red  with 1970/71,  and  e  decrease  of  1.Atfo  for 
"1971/72"  CO!!Ipnred.  Nith  "1967 /6.8".  Furthermore,  in 1972/73 the United  Kingdom 
inportcd 2.8 million metric tons  of wher::t,  thuR heading the list,  follovJed  by 
Gori:leny  with  1.0 n:illion metric tons,  Ite"ly with  0.97  r:lillion nctric tons,  and 
the  Netherlands lvith  0.88 million metric tons.  It must  alPo be  nentioned that, 
in the yoar tinder rcvieN,  the  Co~ity of Six  imported 2.3 million netric tons 
of barley  ~':'  oppof'ed to 2.4 million metric tons the year before,  a decreaf'e  of  ,:. 
3.3%.  ..  In tNrns  0f tho  Cor:uirunity of Nine  the quantity d~clines t6 2.05 million 
metric. tons.  · The  United  Kingdon,  one  of the  imp'ortant  barley-producing countries, 
il!Iportod  only  389  000  ootric tons  from non-meober.countrios,  whereas  Italy with 
1.15 million ootric tons tops tho list,  followed  by  G~rmany lvith  1. 06  million 
oetric tons.  In the period  fror:t  July 1973  to June  1974  the  Community of Nine 
ioportcd e,  tot11l  of  some  5 oillion metric  tons of whee.t  including fl0ur  expressed 
as cereal value. 4•  ,Ri  S~  _  ~1!... J.ntE_a:.Co~  ~V _t_rade; frontier  CO,m.Ren_sa t,i  Onr ,PrO  b_le~  tic 
~-~~~~~~~-------~----~--~-~~~-~-
Intra-Community cereals trade  continued to  show  an  upward  trend,  corresponding 
to the given Community  preference, up  to and  including the  1973/7 4 1:1arketing 
year;  official figures are available, hot.,rever,  only for the  1972/73 
marketing year.  Business  circles  complain  of the uncertainty which1 
because  of frontier compensation,  exists in the  case  of downwards-floating 
currencies and  makes  dealings in futures  extremely ,risky.  Consequently, 
repeated demands  were  made  for advance  fixing of frontier compensatory 
amounts.  Matters were  not.helped by  the fact that France,  one  of the  most 
important  cereals producers in the  Community,  decided to float the franc 
in isolation.  Otring  to events in the mdnetary field,  the  common 
agricultural market has now  split into seven different sections viz.  the 
United Kingdom,  Ireland,  the Benelux countries,  France, Italy,  Geriik'"l.!ly  and 
Denmark,  the  last-named country being the  only one  which  does not  oake  use 
. of frontier compensation.  Although frontier  compensation is the only 
means  of implementing· market  organization in the light of the varying 
currencies it is difficult to maintain,  despite  the simplification undertaken 
on  4 June  whereby  each  country applies the frontier compensation  which 
corresponds to its currency deviation and  the  joint floaters•  amounts  do 
not  change  during the entire marketing year.  Since economic  conditions 
differ greatly among  the  individual Member  States - take  the rate of 
inflation alone as an  example  - it is hard to calculate  compensatory amounts 
which  are  correct in every respect.  ~1e Commission  advocates that, in the 
interest of the  common  agricultural market,  the frontier compensatory amounts 
shall· be  abolished by  31  December  1977• 
In 1972/73  the  Community  of Six transacted  intr~Co~ity trade in cereals, 
including by-products,  to the  amount  of  11  million metric tons,  which  equalled 
the level of the  previous year.  In 1970/71,  an  increase in the  growth  rate 
of 35.1%  was  recorded with reference  to the  previous year;  111971/72"  compared 
with  "1967 /68"  showed  a.n  increase of 18. 3%.  France  was  the  leading supplier 
of cereals in the  Community  with a  total of 8.26  million metric tons, i.e., 
7~  of total supplies.  France  showed  an  increase of 52.4%  in 1971/72  over 
1970/71.  The  most  important  Community  consumers  of French cereals are 
Belgium-Luxembourg,  Germany,  the Netherlands and  the United Kingdom  which 
imported close  on  3 million metric tons in 1972/73• .IZ.-
Italian cereal  imports from the  Conmtini:ty,  on  the  other hand,. remained at a 
very low level.  This must  be  seen in the light of the  special arrangement 
allowed for.  ItD.l~r· in renpect  of inports  fror:~ non-nenber countrieP;'  thiP 
arra..rigement  is gmdually  CCH~ing to  an  end.  The  most  important  i terns  in . 
intr~-Cc1m,runity cereals trade are  wheat  (1972/73:  4.7 nillion metric tons), 
Iik1.ize  (3.9 millioti oetric toris)  and barlt::y  (2 million ·metric tons) •. 
5.  l973/74 still considerable intervention - less wheat  converted for use 
·~~---~~-~--~~--~~~----~~~~~--·--~~-~-
as  .fodd~:r_: · 
-~----
·Intervention· in respect  of  co:nmon  wheat· in tl:ie  six original Member  States 
·still concerned the  substantial amount  oi'  1.21 million metric tons in the 
19i3/74 marketing year.  Germany 'accou..11teci. for approximately 75% 
(760 000 metric tons)  of this, but Belgium's  share  was  also noteworthy, 
with:237 000  metric tons.  These  figures may  be due  to the  absence  of carry-
over pa;iments  for· stocks in hand at· the. end of the  marketing yearo  For 
the first ·time  since the  common  organization of the market  came  'into 
eY.isterice,  the  Commission  did not· deem  such ·payment necessary,  because  of the 
high ·woi,ld  market  prices.  The  Council  agreed with this attitude;. 
J4onetary events' may  also have·  hact  an· effect.  Since,  ~Ii thin the  framel'iork 
of frontier compensation,  the effect. bf the devaluation of the French franc 
'l'ras  not  taken into account  in the  case  of French cereal deliveries· to 
:flelldt-J  Member  States, 'French  co reds were  underpriced· on the German 'and · 
Benelux markets.  The  under-pricing of the  French cereals was·partly responsible 
for  cereals on the GerQan  and Benelux markets being bought  in by intervention 
agencies or for  French  cereals themselves being bought  in.  Although wheat 
intervention indreasedby  193~5% in comparison with 1972/B,  there ·was. a,· 
decrease  of 9·75S  in comparison with  "1968/69" (1968· =·average  1967;  1968  and 
-1969;  1969·= avcrae;e  1968, '1969  and  1970).  In Germany  the intervention agencies 
bought  in  139  000  metric tons of rye;  >>hich  was  58.3%  less· than in the previous 
yco..r 1  ·a...Yld  342  000  raetric tons of barley,  likewise practically only in Germany, 
t<lhich  was  30.5%  more  than in the previous year. ,  Ac·cording to the  cereals market 
.  . 
orgc:nizati~n, the  guarantee  given to :the.,producer in the form of intervention 
possibili.eieB is only an emergency measure •.  Hm..rever,  in the  p;besent  situation 
1!. 
of short  supplies the  intervention stocks ho.ve  o:Nen ·proved very useful in enabli!"l.g 
food aid obligations to  be  met. 
In  1973/74 in the  Comraunity  of Nine,  only 4.43 million metric tons of wheat  were 
consu..rned  by animals  as  u.gainst  7.  78  million metric tons in the  previous year. 
As  has already been mentioned,  on  10  :B'ebruary  1974 the  Commission  ceased to 
encourage  the  conversion of  cereals for fodder in view of the  crisis situation 
i:1  some  C.-we:!. 'lf'i:. 1g  countri  o s • 6  o  Diffep.ential  market price.  deiTe,lopmen~ 
-----------------~--
The  development  of market prices for  common  wheat in the individual Member 
States differed greatly during the  1973/74  marketing yeru.'.  In Italy and 
the United Kingdom  market prices were far above  the  threshold price;  in 
France,  Germany  and  the. Benelux countries they were  mostly belo1'11'  it.·  The 
price differentials fixed in the individual months  of the  marketing year 
fluctuated strongly,  and at the beginning of  1974  were  at maximum  variance 
to the extent of 30  u.a. per metric ton betueen the United Kingdom  on the 
one  hand  and Germany  and  Belgium on  the  other,  and to the  extent  of 55  u.a. 
per metric ton between Italy on the  one hand and  Germany  and  Belgium on  the 
othero  But  such  a  comparison of prices in units of account between Member 
States .with a  weruc  currency and 'Member  States with a  stronz currency only 
presents a  distorted picture of reality,  since in accordance -vri th .llrticle 4( 1) 
of Regulation EEC  No  974/71  of the  Council  the  currency compensatory amount 
was  not applied in Italy, France,  the United Kingdom  and Ireland,  For a 
considerable part· of the  1973/74  marketing year no  import  levies were 
charged for common  wheat from non-member  countries.  Consequently,  prices in 
Uember  States dependent  on imports,  such as the United Kingdom  and ;,rtalyt 
~vere influenced by the  situation prevailing on the Horld 11l8..rket,  where · 
prices were  above  the  threshold price.  Furthermore,  the non-application of 
currency compensatory amounts  in· these countries  (import  subsidy)  caused a 
further price rise.  Prices in Germany,  on the other hand,  Nere  below the 
,threshold price.  This can be attributed to the  more  favourable  supply 
situation for common  wheat in that country and also to the deli  verie.s  of 
French  common  wheat, which uerc  especially cheap because tho  French currency 
compensatory amount  (export  levy) was  not applied.  In France .prices were  at 
a  relatively high level, but were nevertheless belovr  the threshold price for 
the  greater part of the  marketing year,  despite  an increase in deliveries, 
particularly to Italy (+ 395%)  and to  Germany  (+  21%).  In the case  of· 
Germany,  these deliveries were facilitated by the fact that the currency 
compensatory amount  was  not applied,  whereas in the  case of  I~aly, where 
no  currency compensatory amount-was  applied either (import  subsidy),, the 
effects of the  monetary situation were  not  so far-reaching. - 14  - X/658/74-E 
Italy bought  large  qua~tities from  France in order.to avoid having to pay 
the very high v.rorld  market priceo  It must  be  mentioned,  however,  that the 
EJarket  prices of cereals in Italy  1  il1  contrast to  tho  situation in the other 
Member  States, were .always  closer to the  target price than to the 
intervention price~  Since this is the  case not  only with fodder  grain 
(dependent to a  large extent  on imports) but also with wheat,  the form  of 
marketing could also play a  role here. 
V.  Balance altered through  enlargement 
The  entr;;- o-r·  the  United  Kin,:;d.om  meant  that a  major  importer of cereals.was 
added  to the  Comrrnmity  in 1973o  This had  an effect on  the  Community's  state 
of  supply in relation to demand.  The  net  import  requirements  of the 
Community  of Six,  >~hich had dropped  to beloH  10  million metric tons,  could, 
Ul~der normal  conditions,  reach approximately  12  million metric  tons for  the 
Con;,nmi ty of Nine:  maize,  quality t,;heat  for  mixing purposes,  and  durum 
wheat  for the  r.1anufacture  of paste products.  The  British import  requirement 
of wheat  was  in the neighbourhood of 3.5 million metric tons,  of which 
approximately  1  million metric  tons in this marketing year was  covered by 
France  and  the rest by non-member  countries.  In addition to this there was 
an  import  requirement  of some  3 nillion metric  tons of maize,  one-sixth of 
v<hich  1•/aS  supplied by France  • 
.  ?•  TendE;_nc;y.,  ho~.evert  to r.aise  mm  produC?tJ.o~ 
----~--------~--------
There  seems  to be  every reason to believe that the United Kingdom,  whose 
agricultural structure is good,  will become  less dependent  on imports in 
the future.  At  present,  cereals constitute only about  3o%  of British 
acricultural production.  Since  the prices in this field have  developed 
favourably in the past two  years,  many  farmers  succeeded in me~ing up  for 
the  lm.fer  prices for  animal products;  it IIIUSt  not  be  forgotten,  however, 
that production costs for cereals have  increased very sharply.  Producers 
nm..r  show  a  tenclency to use  more  green and  dry fodder  and to sell as much 
Cl3reals  as possible.  Before  the adoption of the  Comnmnity  market 
organizations in the United Kingdom  some  50%  of the wheat  harvest v.ras 
converted to fodder because the difference in price between wheat  arid 
barley was  only slight. - 15  -
The  area under wheat,  which  in 1974  was  approximately  1.25 million 
hectares, has  grown  by  more  than 120  000  hectares since  1972.  Most 
striking, however,  is the  increase in yield per hectare.  In 1972  it \vaG 
42.4  quintalsi  but in 1974  it is estimated at 48  quintals, with peaks of 
over  100  quintals.  More  productive wheat  typos are responsible for this. 
The  development  seems  to be  continuing,  as is also the  case in the other 
Member  States.  It is also possible  that, if cereal prices continue to 
be profitable, not  only 1r1ill  the  trend  to111ards  reduction of forage  crop 
grm,ring  continue but there will also be ·a reduction in· pe-rmanent 
grasslet:ld corresponding to the  Dutch  exarJple with its relatively high 
percencagc of far more  than 50%  of cereals in mixed  fodder.  A similar 
price  o.i tuation will probably see a  reversion to less e:l.."Pensive  substitutes 
such  as  soya,  tapioca, waste.products of the  starch industry,  carob,  peas, 
etc., 1!h:1.ch  would  be  important for cereal consumption in. the United 
Kingdo~ and  therefore,also for imports. 
One  of the  special characteristics of cereal marketing in the United 
Kingdom  is that about  90%  of the total harvest is stored on  the  farms. 
Almost  all cereal-growing holdings are equipped with a  silo and  are also 
obliged to have  a  drying plant because the  moisture  content in the  crop is 
often more  than  18%  or 20%.  ~1e State encourages  the creation and 
improvement  of storage inste.llations.  These  installations are of •lidely 
varying types,  ranging from  impermeable  grain silos which  contain bal,ley 
.  .. 
with a  moisture  content  of  18%  that is sealed off from  air and is intendeQ 
for farm animals  to  sophisticated installations equipped with delivery 
pits, conveyers,  weighing machines,  continuous dryers,etc.  The  cereals 
are stored on  the farm and  sold regularly from  September  to June.  Thus 
the  pre:ducer  takes over part of the tasks which,  in the other member 
countries,  are  generally taken care  of by the wholesale trade.  The  trader 
concentrates on transport of the cereals to the  storehouse of the mill or 
of the feedingstuffs factory,  but he  himself is often the manufacturer or 
distributor of feedingstuffs  and sells seed,  nEnure,  herbicides  and 
pesticides vrhile  at the  same  time  advising on  these matters.  At  present 
there is a  very strong concentration of activities within the  sector. 
This has been achieved to a  very high degree in the feedingstuffs and 
r~lling industries. - 16  - .X/658/74-E 
4~  ;rnt~ns~fication of malting bar.ley and  mal:t.  ~JC:Ports? 
-----~~-~-~~~-------------
It nrust  be:.  mentioned here  thC'.t  the  clioatic conditions in the United 
Kingdom  arc  favourable  to the  production of  malting barleyo  There is 
therefore every  likolihood that it Nill consolidate its position as an 
exporter ofrttJlting barley and  raal t  in the future.  At  the  moment  it is 
exporting to fellow  EEC  Member  Ste~os but also to distant  non~member 
countries such as Nigeria and  Japan.  Total British barley production, 
which accounts for  more  tha~ half of the cereals output, will probably 
increase in the  coming ycc:rs  more  slmvly than wheat  production,  although 
there could be  an increase in the barley surplus in the  long term. 
Denmark  entered the  Corrununi ty as a  com1try  l~hich is  self-support~ng to  a 
large extent in respect  of  cereals~  ~~ize is the only cereal for which 
there ic a  clear import requirr.ment,  ioe. for  the  current marketing year 
225  000  metric  tons~ of which  150  000  metric  tons are likely to  come  from 
non-nember  countries and  75  000  metric  tons from follow  Member  Stateso 
lvi th Belgium and the  Netherlands,  Denmark is after all one  of the  most 
important  Community  countries as regards  output  of animal  products.  Despite 
the fact  that the area under cultivation was  slightly reduced,  the  Danish 
cereals harvest  sho\ved  e,  small  incrc)ase  thanks  to the  excellent Neather 
conditions which prevailed this yc<:r.  Ilonmark 7  with Germany  and France  t 
counts as  one  of the  EEC  countries uhere  rye  is an important product. 
6o  o,,_li  tv of nrime  imnortance for  mal  tin.o.: barley 
~~~~-~-~-~~~-~~----~~~-
Examination of the statistics reveals that in 1974  in Denrn~k barley alone 
~ccountcd for  1.5 million hectares of the estimated 1.8 million hectares 
und.er  cereals.  This  i:J all the  more  notev!Orthy in viev;  of  th~ fact that 
this figure re:fers  to  summer  barley only,  since  the cultivation of v1inter 
barley is forbidden in Denmark  because of the prevalence of mildew.  That 
is why  in Denmark  there is no question of moving from  summer  barley to Ninter 
barley in order to reduce production costs, as is already done  in France, 
Germany  and Belgium.  In  De11I:'.ark  vi  tal importance is attached to quality in 
the  caso of barley.  This is evidenced by  the fact that each year it 
covers  more  than two-thircls  of its seed  requirements with certified seed. In the opinion of Danish producers,  the premiums  paid up to  now  for the 
varietally pure malting barleys offer no  incentive for accepting smaller 
yields or e..'Ctra.  costs for sorting· and  separating the individual  vari~ties  • 
.Accordingly,  further developDents  could depeno.  on the breeding of net-J  vari-
eties \vi th top yields and good cra.ltine properties.  In the present marketing 
year it should be possible to  export  about  150 000 metric ·tons of Danish 
barley to non-member  countries and about  275  000 tons to other Community 
Member  States. 
VI.  Orgn.niz.a~ion of cereals  marke~ stabilizes prices 
1.  ~e~u!i!y_o! ~U£P!Y 
The  US  Department  of .Agriculture estiLmtes the world cereals harvest for 
1974/75  at  916  million metric tons  as  against  a  record harvest of 970.2 
million metric tons the previous year.  Owing  to this smo.ller harvest,  the 
world market price level is at present  considerably above  th~t of the 
Comrrnmity.  It is not  possible to  say how  long this situr',tion 1\d.ll  last.  In 
the USA,  a  series of measures  e1.re  being taken in order to boost home  produc-
tion.  Since the shortage  concerns  fodder grain in particular, the Conmission 
must be prepared to accept  the fact that maize imports,  which in 1973/74  1·rere 
approximately 13  million metric tons,  cn.nnot  amount  to  r.1ore  thon 8.8 metric 
tons in the present  marketing year, particularly since the USA  wishes,  by ~ 
of voluntary control measures,  to arrive at  a  f~ir distribution of the scarce 
supplies  among  those concerned.  The  resulting gap,  ~mich  c~~ ba filled only 
by horne-erown cereals, wheat  in particular,  requires, besides  a  sparing use 
of cereals in the fodder sector,  a  careful export  policy on the part of the 
Cor.ununi ty focused  on those cormtries with the greatest supply shortages. The 
Cornr.n.mi ty buyer has to reckon with the high world market  level only for 
imported goods,  ~mereus for Community  production the much  lower Community 
level prevails.  This security of supply as  a  result  of market  organization 
has  also. been aclrnoHledged by the  Cor:urruni tyt  s  Economic  e..nd  Social  Cornmi ttee 
in its ''Balance sheet of the conmon  agricultural policy",  since it goes hand 
in hand with price stabilization. 
2.  ~e~o!d_c2~~!Y_h~~e~t_bEi~  Ee!i~f 
The  fact  that the Cornrnmi ty cereals harvest reached ne,_.  record 
heights in 1974  1-m.s  fortunate in vieN of the swing to scarcity 
on the market.  The  latest estir.tated figures  issued by the 
Statistical  O~fice of the European Communities  show that the 
total cereals harvest is 108  million metric tons as  cor.tpared 
with  ~1  million metric tons in 1967.  The  increase can be 
attributed nlmost  exclusively to  a  rise in the yield per hectare 
of all types of cereal in all lllember  States. Tho  rwerar,e  ~·ie1cl_ of ulwat  per hect2.re 1  for  ircn-Gance,  iR  er::.tiDo,teri_  c,t 
Improved  cr'-lti"tl'n"tion 
technique:::,  e-nd  eve:r·-L1creo.r::.ing  -:1c.:e  of  more  productive  ceree>..l  vurieties, 
should  r·em.ll t  in  n,  further rise in yield:-;  per hecto,re  in the  coDing :;•ears. 
Regio:c.C'.l  top yielcls  r-hoN  that  the  limits h;::,ve  not  yet been recched;  in 
the:::e  top ;yields,  hol·Jever,  qu...'"U.":tito.tive  improvemen-t;  did not  alw;::,ys  1~eep 
p~\ce 1·1i th qt1.':!.lit2.tive  requirements. 
Hhe:1  thir re,ort ;·1es  bcin.z written,  the  Co!illTliGsion  1·1orked  out  the  Comra"LL"rli t;;r 
cere~;.ls b:'.hncc  f(Jr  'Clle  197 4/75  r·-.::.rketinc year  1  which  r:;ave  t:1e  following 
results for the  r:1oot  iupcrtant types of cereals: 
r---------- ............. --- ... .........-..-.-...i..-....-..-..-
1._. -~--------~~---
1 
I
Lr~r::.  :u1c:er  cult  i v;::, t ion 
(rn1ll1ons of ha) 
jriGld  (quintr>lG  per h2.) 
lProd.uc-tion  (~.1illions of metPic  tons) 
Couswdption  on the  f;cr;J 
'l'r.:'.nc j_t icnu.l  stock:s 
I:arket  oalcf.3 
Av2.ilo.ble  qu-:1.ntitics 
Domestic  concu.rnption 
Cf  vJhich:  for fodder purposes 
C2.rry-over  o.t  end  of  r~arket  inc;  year 
Douestic requirer,1ents 
(+)  Deficit  (  ..  ) 
Imports 
9·5 
43.3 
1].1.0 
7·5 
5·7 
33.5 
39.2 
31.7 
36.0 
+ 3.2 
+  3.8 
8.8  3.0 
39·3  4D.o 
34.4  1(.,~. 
15.4  L] .• 5 
1.4  2.9 
19.0  9·9 
20.4  12.8 
19.0  20.1 
1
15.3 
2.5 
20.3  I  22.6 
-:- 0.1  - 9.8 
H.2 
1.3 
+  1.5  f+  8.8 
1.8 
20.3 
3.6 
0.6 
0.3 
3.0 
3.3 
3.5 
o.6 
+ 1.2  ------ .. ·-~- ._,.__...._,  ... ~----L--..of~--..  ......... --......  .......-~·+-~-.... --·-
]!;xports'  j+  7.0  +  1.6  1- 1.0  i+  0.5 
1
~.~1~~-~~~-~--~-------.1:2.:.':  .... -+:  ..  ~.:.~-~J  _:_D_~  __  j:~~O.:._~ 
'  .  I  , 
j -.- i+ 0.6 
1-1.7  i+ 0.3  i  ·-·.-.. ... -~~---~==------· ::;z  ,..  = -~.=:=.--.  =~  ~ - 19  -
Admittedly,  it T!lUSt  be  so.id  t~mt  c:,  difference  of  o:~inion exists in  soue 
MeMber  Staten  1  c.s  is evidenced by  t~re fo.ct  th::::.t  they stilL in  >Jist  6n  ;:>, 
roize  import  of 10.9 l";Jillio"l  raetric tons.  There  is o,lso  o.  cliffere;1ce 
of opinion in reG&..rd  to the  uze  of  cer~r.lc for  fodC.er  p·LU'poses. 
Barley 
I'faize 
. ~otal 